In this lesson, we begin to discuss geopolitical structure, or the context within which geopolitical agency takes place. While we will primarily review George Modelski’s model of cycles of world leadership, I have also included supplementary information on Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory.
By the end of this lesson, you should be able to:
Please see your Canvas course space for a complete listing of this lesson's required readings, assignments, and due dates.
If you have any general course questions, please post them to our Course Questions Discussion located in the General Information Module in Canvas. I will check that discussion forum regularly to respond as appropriate. While you are there, feel free to post your own responses and comments if you are able to help out a classmate.
Please begin by reading Chapter 7 of Flint, C. (2016). Introduction to geopolitics (3rd ed.). London: Routledge.
Thus far, we have really focused on the ability of agents to make strategic geopolitical choices and decisions and how these choices are complicated by competing goals and changing circumstances. However, decisions are not made in a social and political vacuum.
Our ability to make choices is an important aspect of our everyday lives. This ability affords us some modicum of control in a very complex socio-political landscape. Indeed, our ability to make key decisions is an exercise of our personal agency. This agency aids in our strategic navigation and negotiation of social, political, cultural, and economic terrain so that we can work towards social, cultural, financial (etc.) security. But, as the last paragraph highlighted, we make these decisions within a structure that shapes and constrains the selection of choices and decisions we have to make. This is certainly true at the individual scale—and now we will investigate how geopolitical structure works at the national and global scales.
As Flint (2016) explains, “One of the benefits of this (the Modelski) model is an understanding of global politics that is based on empirical observation. In contrast, the classical geopoliticians of the nineteenth and early twentieth century invoked a ‘God’s eye view of the world,’ providing simple histories or theories that, they claimed, not only explained what has happened in the past but suggested particular policies inform the actions of their own country in a global competition with others (Parker, 1985). In other words, geopoliticians make dubious claims of historical and theoretical ‘objectivity’ to support their own biased view of how their country should compete in the world.” (p. 217)
Thus, as we make our own policy recommendations for our DVPM projects, we should understand how these fit in with global geopolitical structures; how these structures shape agency; and also how such policies and actions are justified through various geopolitical claims, as mentioned above.
A cautionary note worth repeating from Flint, 2016, p. 218:
Modelski’s model of geopolitics is not capable of predicting events. It is a historical model that interprets a wealth of historic data in a simplified framework. In other words, it is a descriptive model. Also, Modelski’s model is useful, but only within certain parameters. His view of geopolitics is limited to conflicts between the major powers; smaller countries and geopolitical actors that are not countries are not included in this model. However, the model is useful for introducing the idea of a geopolitical structure and offering a context for current geopolitical events.
George Modelski, who presented his ideas in the book, Long Cycles in World Politics (1987), is the chief architect of long cycle theory. In a nutshell, long cycle theory describes the connection between war cycles, economic supremacy, and the political aspects of world leadership.
Long cycles, or long waves, offer interesting perspectives on global politics by permitting "the careful exploration of the ways in which world wars have recurred, and lead states such as Britain and the United States have succeeded each other in an orderly manner." The long cycle is a period of time lasting approximately 70 to 100 years. Modelski divides the long cycle into four phases. When periods of global war, which could last as much as one-fourth of the total long cycle, are factored in, the cycle can last from 87 to 122 years.
Many traditional theories of international relations, including the other approaches to hegemony, believe that the baseline nature of the international system is anarchy. Modelski's long cycle theory, however, states that war and other destabilizing events are a natural product of the long cycle and larger global system cycle. They are part of the living processes of the global polity and social order. Wars are "systemic decisions" that "punctuate the movement of the system at regular intervals." Because "world politics is not a random process of hit or miss, win or lose, depending on the luck of the draw or the brute strength of the contestants," anarchy simply doesn't play a role. After all, long cycles have provided, for the last five centuries, a means for the successive selection and operation of numerous world leaders.
Modelski used to believe that long cycles were a product of the modern period. He suggests that the five long cycles, which have taken place since about 1500, are each a part of a larger global system cycle, or the modern world system. Under the terms of long cycle theory, five hegemonic long cycles have taken place, each strongly correlating to economic Kondratieff Waves (or K-Waves). The first hegemon would have been Portugal during the 16th century, then the Netherlands during the 17th century. Next, Great Britain served twice, first during the 18th century, then during the 19th century. The United States has been serving as hegemon since the end of World War II.
Source: Wikipedia: Hegemonic stability theory [1]
As Flint explained in his cautionary note above, Modelski’s model is useful for thinking about geopolitical structure. In particular, it helps us to observe the ways in which world leaders play a key role in creating a global geopolitical structure. Further, he notes that we can examine how the geopolitical structure changes over time, and how that change aids our interpretation (or contextualization) of geopolitical codes (of the US, other states, or non-state actors). Flint states, “geopolitical decisions are made with an eye toward the global geopolitical context, and especially the ability of a dominant power to set the agenda.” (p. 218)
Modelski’s model is a historically based theory founded on his interest in naval history. Some key elements of his theory are:
Flint calls our attention to the representation of world powers in Modelski’s model. They are referred to as “leaders” rather than hegemons or super powers. This is important because it implies that other countries are “willing followers”, whereas the representations of hegemons and super powers acknowledge the relationship of dominance and use of force (economic, military, or otherwise).
Modelski’s model identifies five previous cycles of world leadership in Table 7.1:
World Leader | Century | Global War | Challenger | Coalition Partners |
---|---|---|---|---|
Portugal | 1500s | 1494-1516 | Spain | Netherlands |
Netherlands | 1600s | 1580-1609 | France | England |
Great Britain | 1700s | 1688-1713 | France | Russia |
Great Britain | 1800s | 1792-1815 | Germany | US plus allies |
United States | 1900s | 1914-1945 | Soviet Union/al-Qaeda | NATO/Coalition of willing |
(Cycles of World Leadership from Flint, 2016, p. 221)
Flint notes that the above cycles of world leadership conveniently show that Great Britain held two consecutive cycles of world leadership prior to the United States’ current position as the world leader. This is ‘convenient’ because, according to the model, the US is at the end of its period of world leadership. However, the precedent set by Great Britain shows that perhaps the US will ‘serve’ as world leader for one more cycle. In order to make our own assessment of the US’s attempt to maintain its preeminent power status in the face of challenges to its leadership, Flint asks us to consider the dynamics of two separate but related concerns:
Modelski Phase | Preference for World Order | Availability of World Order |
---|---|---|
Global War | High | Low |
World Power | High | High |
Delegitimization | Low | High |
Deconcentration | Low | Low |
(Table 7.2 from Flint, 2016, p. 225)
The US's rise into world leadership after World Wars I & II corresponds to the global war phase of Modelski’s model. During that time, there was a high preference for world order, but generally a low availability of world order. The US was well poised to take the charge in the post-WWII geopolitical landscape. Flint provides a thorough analysis of the ways in which the US fits into the Modelski model on pages 230-232. It is a good example that can help you better understand some of the more abstract aspects of the Modelski model within a specific context.
Flint also provides great examples that highlight the application of the Modelski model to contemporary states and organizations of states (the European Union). I won’t recount them here, but make sure you have read The War on Terror and Modelski’s Model (p. 232), The European Union and Modelski’s Model (p. 233), China and Modelski’s Model (pgs. 234-235), and North Korea, the NPT, and Modelski’s Model (pgs. 236-237).
Lastly, Flint discusses the legacy of world leadership by exploring “feedback systems in Modelski’s model” (p. 237). The first feedback system is the “developmental loop”—which explains that the “innovations” brought about by world leaders remain even after their time as a world leader expires. Flint provides the example of the United States—presumably, the innovations of the idea of self-determination as well as institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank and the like, will continue to play a role in future global geopolitics. They may shift and change, but their foundation has been established and thus they will continue to have some influence (even if altered) going forward.
The second feedback system is a “regulatory loop” that “examines the process of an emerging challenger and the establishment of a new world leader” (p. 237). While Flint reminds us that the Modelski model is not a predictive model, it does highlight some historical patterns that can give us insight into possible future outcomes. In particular, he explains that the next world leader does not typically fall to the challenger of the current world leader. Rather, the next world leader is usually one of the coalitions or allied countries. For example, the case of the US and Great Britain followed this process. Germany challenged Great Britain’s role as world leader, which brought on two world wars. Germany needed allies/a coalition to challenge Great Britain’s leadership status. Great Britain, in turn, could not fight off the challenger alone and needed to establish a coalition of allied forces to fend off Germany. Flint explains that both the previous leader (Great Britain) and its challenger (Germany) exhausted their material capacity for power in the long phase of the global war (WWI & WWII). But the US became an increasingly prominent member of the world leaders’ coalition and at the end of the wars, was able to assume the “preeminent global position”. Thus, Flint explains, we might look at this pattern in history to make an educated guess that the next nation to rise to world power will be among the US’s allies, rather than its adversaries.
However, Flint does caution us that the Modelski model views global geopolitics through a prism that only considers the state to be a key strategic actor. The rise of non-state actors as legitimate threats complicates the model in a way that is yet to be resolved.
Box 7.2 (Flint, p. 220) gives only a cursory mention of Wallerstein’s world-systems theory. This video provides a good overview of the theory. You will need to re-read the box and also watch the video below in order to complete the blog assignment for this week.
Watch this video on Immanuel Wallerstein's World Systems Analysis. [2]
Now, the first thing I'd like to discuss with you now is the legacy of colonialism.
Now colonialism is defined as how a foreign power maintains political, social, economic, and cultural domination for an extended period of time over a group of people or a country. In simple terms, colonialism is ruled by outsiders. Relations oftentimes between the colonial nation and the colonized people are very similar to relationships that are described in class terms between the dominant capitalist class and the proletariat. This is very reminiscent of the work of Karl Marx when he talked about the haves and the have-nots.
Now, by the nineteen-eighties in the world, traditional colonization - colonialism –had pretty much disappeared. Most of the nations that had been colonies prior to, say, World War I, had achieved some sort of political independence and had established their own governments. And the way that that occurs is the colonizing nation had swooped in and set up a government in these countries, and after a period of time, when these nations decided that they no longer needed to be in the country for whatever reasons - whether that was they no longer needed the labor resources or they no longer needed natural resources -they largely just sort of left. And they left the country to set up its own government and to try and fix many of the problems that had been inherent in the colonial systems of the past.
Colonial domination established some patterns of economic exploitation and a lot of these countries that continued on even after they achieved their own nationhood. And part of the reason for that is because some of these nations had never been allowed to develop their own infrastructure, develop their own industry and technology. And they had become very dependent on the countries that had come in to colonize them (what we would refer to as colonial masters). So when the colonists moved out it caused a continuing dependence and foreign domination, which today we refer to as neo-colonialism: the continued dependence on more industrialized nations for managerial and technical expertise by the former colonies.
This is a pretty common occurrence with countries that were once colonized. So whether we're actually talking about colonialism or neocolonialism it's important to note that the economic and political consequences are very real.
Sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein has done a lot of work in this area. He has what he termed world systems analysis which is a perspective or a theory which says that there are unequal economic and political relationships in which certain industrialized nations (among those the United States) and their global corporations still continue to dominate at the core of the world system. At the semi-periphery of this system would be countries that have somewhat marginal economic status. They're kind of in the middle. They're not a dependent country necessarily. However, they do depend on the assistance of those core nations at times. The countries that fall into this category could be South Korea, India, Mexico.
And then there's a third category: the peripheral nations. The peripheral nations of the world are still in an exploitative relationship to the core nations. And the core nations and their corporations often control and exploit the non-core nations’ economies, natural resources, and labor pools.
So the division between core and periphery nations is significant and it's a very stable relationship. And what I mean by stable relationship is once you find a place in one of these categories it's extremely challenging to move yourself out. The core nations have pretty much been the core nations for decades, if not a few centuries. The semi-peripheral nations, however - we have had some countries that have lifted themselves from the periphery into that semi-peripheral state. It will be challenging, indeed, for those semi-peripheral nations, however, to bump up into the core nation category, with the exception of a couple of nations. I would have to say that China and India are probably the two that would be most readily poised to move themselves up into a core nation category. And the largest reason for this is the development of an infrastructure, industrialization, and the size of their population. They have so many people to contribute to a workforce in those countries that that will very rapidly help them to overcome their semi-peripheral status and maybe move into that core nation ranking.
So Wallerstein kind of speculated that the system as we currently understand it will undergo some changes as the world becomes increasingly urbanized. Once we do become urbanized we will actually start to eliminate the large pools of low-cost workers that live today in rural areas. And so, in the future, core nations are going to have to find other ways to reduce labor costs. So we're exhausting land or exhausting resources such as water through clear-cutting and pollution. We're driving up the cost of production and we're also depleting our labor source. This has some serious ramifications for quote-unquote business as we know it on the world labor market.
Wallerstein world systems analysis is a very widely used theory that falls under the broader spectrum of what we call dependency theories. So dependency theories, in general, talk about developing countries -even while making economic advances -will remain subservient and weak to core nations and large corporations.
And I think there is a lot of truth to Wallerstein’s assumptions and to dependency theories in general and you really can see that it is conflict type of theory. The interdependency of industrialized nations allows them to continue to exploit developing countries. The industrialized nations playing the roles of the bourgeoisie, or the haves, and the developing countries playing the role of the proletariat, or the have-nots. So what's actually happening here with regard to natural resources in the world? A growing share of the human resources and the natural resources of developing countries is actually being shifted. It’s being redistributed to the core industrialized nations. This happens because developing countries go into debt to core nations as a result of foreign aid, loans, trade deficits, etc. And when that happens and the developed nations start to call in their markers - one of the ways in which they can pay us back is by allowing corporations to exploit the workers and the natural resources of that country.
So what actually ends up happening in developing nations is, for example, the currencies may be devalued, workers wages might be frozen. You'll have an increased privatization of industry and a reduction in government services and employment because as the government scrambles to try and pay back the debts they owe to core nations, they take money away from building their own infrastructure.
This is problematic for those dependent countries because it puts them in a position of spinning their wheels more or less. They don't really ever get to significantly lift themselves out of the status that they're in because they're caught in a cycle of having to pay the man, basically.
All right, I hope this helps you to understand these basic concepts. We'll talk again soon. Have a great day. Take care! Bye bye!
Modelski’s model allows us to put contemporary geopolitics within a framework that understands it as a continuation of historical processes and trends rather than isolated or unrelated events. The Modelski model offers greater understanding of an event, its significance and implications as it relates to world politics / global geopolitics. It is a model where current events can be used as data points to be plugged in to the model to investigate whether or not they counter or support trends we would expect from the Modelski model.
Of course, there will be deviations, but, nonetheless, it is a good teaching tool and certainly useful for looking at global geopolitics over a longer period of time.
Nonetheless, we should be aware of the critiques of the model—many of which are similar critiques of Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis. The first critique is that of historical determinism. Observing cyclical patterns in the past does not allow us to predict that the demise of the US’s world leadership role is inevitable or determined. This is connected to the critique of structural determinism: the US is a geopolitical agent and thus has some degree of freedom to choose actions that may or may not lead to a “drift towards global war”. Of course, the US is constrained by various other global structures and state agents. Nonetheless, our path has not been predetermined on a track towards global war.
Another set of criticisms relate to some points I mentioned above. 1) The state is the unit of analysis—geopolitical agents are all state actors; 2) the focus is on rich, powerful countries and not inclusive of poorer countries in the “global south”. Furthermore, Modelski’s measure of power was predicated on the historical importance of sea-power. With the advent of remote weapons and surveillance systems (i.e., unmanned drones), we may reconsider how we evaluate Modelski’s power index.
Please visit the Lesson 7 Module in Canvas for a detailed description of the assignment, including due dates and submission instructions.
You should now be able to:
You have reached the end of Lesson 7! Double-check the Lesson 7 module in Canvas to make sure you have completed all of the activities listed there before you begin Lesson 8.